Care for Nurses Only? Medicine and the Perceiving Eye by Martinsen, Elin Håkonsen
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Care for Nurses Only? Medicine and the Perceiving Eye
Elin Ha ˚konsen Martinsen
Published online: 7 December 2010
  The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In this paper I introduce a theoretical framework on care developed by
the Norwegian nurse and philosopher Kari Martinsen, and I argue that this approach
has relevance not only within nursing, but also within clinical medicine. I try to
substantiate this claim by analysing some of the key concepts in this approach, and I
illustrate the potential clinical relevance of this approach by applying it in relation to
two care scenarios. Finally, I discuss some of the concerns that have been raised in
relation to the aim of highlighting care in medicine.
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Introduction
Most of us agree that the assumption that ‘‘nurses care’’ and ‘‘doctors cure’’ is too
simplistic, and that it is not uncommon for many nurses not to care very much at all,
and for some doctors to care a great deal. However, in spite of this, there still is a
theoretical discrepancy between nursing and medicine in relation to how care is
handled; while care may be said to constitute an important part of professional self-
understanding in nursing
1 [7, 27, 28, 38, 39], it still may be said to be situated in the
margins of the ethical thinking in medicine [9, 42, 51, 52], and seldom applied to
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1 However, this does not mean that there is agreement on how care is to be understood in relation to
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monopolizing the concept of care [49].
In light of this theoretical discrepancy and the fact that many patients complain
about a lack of care when meeting with their doctors, and experiencing ignorance,
insensitivity or degrading behaviour [24, 26, 35], this urges a further analysis of the
relevance of the care discourse in medicine. Implementing nursing care perspectives
in medicine is controversial for a number of reasons, and may be why it has not been
explored thoroughly. However, this is not a reason to avoid the topic. On the
contrary, there may be powerful perspectives that have not been considered because
of prejudice.
Therefore, in this paper I attempt to bring some of this knowledge from nursing
into the ﬁeld of medicine, taking the inﬂuential scholarly works on care by
Norwegian nursing scientist and philosopher Kari Martinsen as my point of
departure.
2 Kari Martinsen’s work has inﬂuenced the current understanding of care
in nursing in Scandinavian countries, and she belongs to a different theoretical
tradition than the Gilligan’s Anglo-American. Investigating Martinsen in the context
of medicine will be interesting because it will represent an attempt to bridge the gap
between related research traditions in medicine and nursing, and it will represent an
attempt to relate the Scandinavian nursing debate on care inspired by phenome-
nology to the Anglo-American tradition of care ethics.
Interestingly, Søren Holm asks a similar question in his article, ‘‘What should
other healthcare professions learn from nursing ethics?’’ [21]. However, Holm and I
reach different conclusions: while Holm rejects the inﬂuence and importance of
ethics of care in relation to nursing ethics and health care ethics in general,
3 I
welcome these perspectives, also in medicine.
In this paper I focus my attention on Martinsen’s analysis of the different clinical
gazes [41], and I will explore how this perspective may represent a proliﬁc approach
towards care in medicine. Care, by deﬁnition, ‘‘requires the recognition of a need’’
[57], so focusing on the way physicians see may represent an advantageous way of
approaching care in medicine. The dominating gaze in medicine, however, is often
referred to as powerful, objectifying and dehumanizing [14, 22, 24]. Therefore, I
argue with Kari Martinsen that medicine needs to encourage and develop a
‘‘perceiving eye’’ [41]. The fostering of such an eye, or gaze,
4 may facilitate care in
each medical encounter, as well as reﬁning clinical proﬁciency. In support of this
claim, I ﬁrst draw on some of the main features in Martinsen’s care theory, trying to
make her thinking comprehensible for readers outside Nordic countries as well.
Subsequently, I analyse Martinsen’s essay Seeing with the Heart’s Eye, focusing on
2 Even though Kari Martinsen’s point of departure is the philosophy of nursing, her analysis focuses
more on the relationship between the patient and health care professional in general than on the particular
relationship between patient and nurse. Therefore I ﬁnd her analyses also relevant in relation to medicine.
3 Holm concludes that other healthcare ethics should learn from the resistance of nursing ethics to
analytic reductionism, however, he does not ascribe this resistance to inﬂuences from an ethics of care
[21]. Instead, he points to other theoretical positions such as some feminist ethicists (however, not the
feminist ethicists dealing with care) and modern particularists emphasizing the situational importance of
ethical decision making, as well as inﬂuences from various schools of continental philosophy.
4 I use the terms ‘eye’ and ‘gaze’ interchangeably throughout in the text.
16 Health Care Anal (2011) 19:15–27
123her analysis of what seeing means in health care (ibid.). By using examples, I aim to
illustrate how the development of a sensous and perceiving eye in medicine may be
of ethical as well as epistemological importance for the clinical encounter. Finally, I
will discuss different objections to focusing on care in medicine, in relation to the
perspective developed above.
Kari Martinsen’s Philosophy of Caring
Inﬂuenced by phenomenology and the historic roots of caring in nursing, Kari
Martinsen has approached the concept of care through different levels of analysis. I
rely for the most part in this paper on her later works in which she ‘‘is thinking
with,’’ to use her own expression, the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud E.
Løgstrup by analysing care phenomenologically [39–41].
Martinsen emphasizes care as being basic to human existence. She argues that as
human beings we are basically social and dependent on other people and relies here
on Løgstrup’s view of human life as a life in interdependence
5 [39, 40]. The
assumption that human beings are interconnected and dependent upon each other
thus represents a central ontological feature of Martinsen’s theory. Thus, care
constitutes a fundamental precondition of our lives: As human beings, we are
basically dependent, and this dependency requires a human response in the form of
care.
Martinsen always interprets a situation of care as being contextual, emotionally
laden and particularistic in nature: ‘‘Care is to be concrete and present in a
relationship by our senses and our bodies. It is always to be in a movement away
from ourselves and towards the other,’’ she writes [36, p. 11]. Care is to relate to the
other in an unconditional and spontaneous way as a response to the concrete
situation of the other. Nevertheless, in order to accomplish this, we must be able to
recognize his or her needs in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, noticing the need to care may
be conceived of as a basic element of care [57].
6 Similarly, Martinsen argues that in
order to care for the patient, ‘‘we must both be able to see and express the [patient’s]
appeal for help in order to strengthen the [patient’s] life courage in the suffering’’
[37, p. 9]. She thus highlights the importance of noticing the need to care (to see), at
the same time as focusing on the importance of practical action in care (to express).
She also indicates an important ethical implication: namely, the strengthening of a
patient’s life courage. Consequently, care is not only about being empathic or being
emotionally attached. The essential element, however, is to be able to recognize the
need of the other and to act accordingly. For that reason, practical action represents
an important dimension in Martinsen’s care approach, together with a relational and
5 Through phenomenological investigations, Løgstrup came up with some basic phenomena which
govern human interaction, and in his later writings he calls these modes of reaction ‘‘spontaneous
manifestations of life’’ or ‘‘spontaneous utterances of life.’’ Løgstrup argues that phenomena such as trust,
hope, compassion and the openness of speech are pre-cultural characteristics of our existence, and
ontologically express the basic entanglement of individual human beings [29, 30].
6 According to Tronto, the three other elements of care are: to take care of, care-giving and care-
receiving [57].
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simultaneously’’ [3, 38].
Perceiving and Recording
A central feature of the care philosophy of Martinsen is her emphasis on perception
in our interaction with others, as well as in clinical situations, and she considers
perception to constitute an important part of clinical judgment.
7 In the essay Seeing
with the Heart’s Eye Martinsen explores different dimensions of the clinician’s gaze
[41]. She starts by drawing a distinction between ‘‘perceiving’’ and ‘‘recording’’:
‘‘By recording is meant the putting of oneself in an outside position, classifying,’’
she argues (p. 72). When we record, we systematize and differentiate, albeit within
the frameworks of an already existing conceptual system. The recording eye is
reductionistic and neutral; it may reduce living characteristics, such as a laughing
face, to clinical signs, characteristics and marks. It is the eye of the disinterested
observer, in which the other, as a person, may become indifferent to us. In her
description of the recording eye, Martinsen is also inspired by and refers to
Løgstrup’s conception of the ‘‘eye of the epoch’’ [31] and to Michel Foucault’s
well-known analyses of ‘‘the classifying gaze’’ and ‘‘the examining gaze’’ in
medicine [14].
In contrast the perceiving eye is characterized by openness towards the world,
where sensation and emotions are working together, says Martinsen. The perceiving
eye opens for ‘‘a seeing emotion,’’ in which we are touched and emotionally
involved before we understand the needs of the other. Martinsen refers in this
connection to the story of the Good Samaritan: The Samaritan saw the half-dead
stranger and ‘‘was moved with compassion’’ [55]. He did not record ﬁrst; instead, he
was struck, pained by the wounded stranger. Martinsen refers here to the Greek
word in the text, esplanknistae, which is ‘‘a verb made from a noun, meaning
something to do with guts, stomach, abdomen, in other words an incredible physical
pain’’ (Johannes Møllehave, cited in [41]). He was ‘‘pained in the gut,’’ meaning
that ‘‘he saw with his whole body, which was touched’’ (p. 84). The Samaritan’s
understanding of the situation was thus led by his senses, by his sensuous and
perceiving eye.
So, why does Martinsen bring the story of the Good Samaritan into an essay on
seeing in health care?
8 The story illustrates how the perceiving eye may facilitate
care. In the story, the priest, the Levite and the Samaritan all saw the half-dead man,
although they saw him in different ways. Signiﬁcantly, the way they saw him had a
major impact on the way they acted: the well-established and theoretically educated
men, the priest and the Levite, saw the half-dead man and passed him by. Did they
7 Here Martinsen is inﬂuenced by Løgstrup and his position of ‘‘phenomenology of creation.’’ To be
perceptive and open reﬂects thus the attitude of the phenomenology of creation, of being reticent and of
receiving the other as a gift [39, 40].
8 The story of the Good Samaritan is regarded as an exemplary story in the Nordic tradition within care
ethics and nursing ethics, and its intrinsic value of charity is also considered as part of the basic values in
the Norwegian health care system [54, 48].
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ailing man recorded as a stranger and therefore not of their concern, based on theory
and culture? The Samaritan, on the other hand, got within the ‘‘perceiving range of
life’’ [41]. He did not record ﬁrst; instead, he was struck, pained by the wounded
stranger.
What Gaze is at Work in Medicine?
How can we further transfer these theoretical insights to medicine? What gaze is at
work here? As physicians we are trained to create a thorough medical history and
make a clinical examination in order to give a proper diagnosis. The process of
interviewing and examining the patient operates within a ﬁxed framework, and even
though we are encouraged to ask open-ended questions, the medical interview
follows a standard scheme, investigating the patient’s heredity, social history,
education, employment history, drug history, tobacco and alcohol consumption,
home circumstances, and the history of the present complaint(s). Likewise, the
physical examination of the patient operates within the same framework, leading us
towards a possible diagnosis of the patient. This perspective is evident if we go to a
recenty updated text book in clinical examination for medical students [13]: ‘‘The
examination really begins from the moments you set eyes on the patient,’’ Epstein
et al. write (p. 20). ‘‘As the patient approaches you in the consulting or examination
room, observe the posture, gait and character of the stride,’’ and when making your
initial acquaintance with the patient, ‘‘the grip of the handshake usually provides
some useful information’’ (p. 20–21). Thus, the ﬁrst step of the examination is the
inspection, during which we initially try to create a general impression of the
patient: does she look well, or not? Is there any striking physical abnormality? Then
we inspect the patient more speciﬁcally in relation to our examination of the
different body systems, looking for signs and stigmata before we continue with
palpation and auscultation of the heart and lungs. The medical exploring gaze thus
operates within a ﬁxed framework by systematizing, differentiating and classifying
the information from the patient within a ﬁxed totality. At the same time, physicians
aim at remaining ‘‘professional’’ in meetings with patients. We usually understand
the word professional to mean ‘‘keeping sufﬁcient distance, not being overly
involved (restraining emotions) and being objective and a matter of fact in one’s
speech’’ [41]. In light of this, I will argue that the dominant gaze of medical practice
is a recording gaze, focusing too heavily on diagnoses and diseases alone and
leaving out the sensitive openness to the patient’s particular situation.
9 This is also
underscored by recent empirical ﬁndings, pointing to how physicians actually
‘‘essentialise’’ the patients’ stories by breaking them down into concrete complaints
and categorising the symptoms into medical sense [1], as well as studies pointing to
9 Even so, there are different attempts to include the patient’s perspective to a greater extent into medical
practice. Patient-centred medicine represents one example of such an approach, in which the importance
of pursuing both the patient’s and the physician’s agenda is emphasized [4, 44]. The works on clinical
empathy in medicine by Halpern [15, 16] represents another example, as well as the works of the Nordic
general practitioners Malterud and Hollnagel [33, 34].
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patient [35]. A possible consequence of such a recording gaze in medicine may be
that physicians do not always ‘‘trust their own eyes’’ when meeting with patients
who suffer. Let me offer an example:
Do We Not Trust Our Eyes?
In an article in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical Association, Kristin Ribe, who
has suffered for several years from self-injury and suicidal thoughts, describes her
meeting with health personnel (ﬁrst and foremost physicians) at the emergency
ward, arriving with self-inﬂicted bleeding wounds again and again [53]. She
describes anger or indifference by the doctors who meet her with expressions such
as ‘‘Are you here again, pull yourself together!’’ or ‘‘Now you must stop being
silly!’’ or ‘‘We can’t use all our time on you. Don’t you see how many people are in
the waiting room?’’ ‘‘One doctor did not even say hello to me,’’ she writes. ‘‘He just
equipped himself and talked over an hour with the nurse about his cottage, while I
was only something lying there, a scrap, a nothing’’ (ibid.).
It is tempting and may be relevant to draw a parallel here between the doctors’
behaviour and that of the priest and the Levite in the story of the Good Samaritan.
Like the priest and the Levite, these doctors might not believe their own eyes. A
young woman arrives at the emergency unit with bleeding wounds, and they meet
her with ignorance, blame or anger. Did they not believe their eyes? They probably
saw her with a recording gaze, founded on their medical knowledge and the medical
culture. Among many health professionals, there has been a widespread tendency to
think and talk about self-injuring patients as manipulative [43]. Did the doctors
record the patient as manipulative and therefore outside of their moral concern—just
like the priest and the Levite, who recorded the injured man as a stranger and as
someone they were not obliged to help, based on their culture and their laws?
The recording gaze is powerful in its objectiﬁcation of the other. Through a
recording eye, we may see a person as an object or a completed fact, and this may
threaten the person’s integrity. Integrity means that which must not be hurt,
damaged or altered, but which should be respected and protected [23], and for a
person who is seen as an object, it may be both painful and damaging. The self-
injuring girl precisely delineates the damaging effects of a recording eye when she
says she felt like ‘‘a scrap, a nothing’’ when treated by the doctor who ignored her.
Through this type of objectifying behaviour, the doctor threatened her integrity. As
a consequence, we see how the recording activity of the professionally trained eye
may be damaging to the patient. However, this kind of viewing of the patient is also
necessary in order to understand the patient’s medical condition and to reach a
diagnosis. Thus, in order to care for the patient in a broader sense than just making a
diagnosis and initiating treatment, we must strive to integrate and combine the two
modes of seeing the patient: to see with openness and ease, such as seeing with the
perceiving eye, while also seeing in an academic, exploring and evaluating way.
Besides the protection of patient integrity, Martinsen points to another important
ethical implication of displaying a perceiving gaze in medicine, namely, the
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illustrated in the article by Ribe, in which she describes physicians who actually saw
her, receiving her appeal for help, rather than abandoning it. She describes the good
in a physician who saw her scars and said: ‘‘I see you have had a difﬁcult time,’’ and
she describes the positive potential in such a response from another person, as
something that was ‘‘very good to feel’’ and to take with her when she returned
outside again [53]. ‘‘I need the physician at the emergency ward, whose hands
trembled while he was suturing,’’ she writes. ‘‘For him I was not routine. My wound,
my pain moved him. And that was very good to feel, to take with me outside’’ (ibid.).
The Epistemic Potential of Care
Care may also be epistemologically essential in the clinical encounter, and in the
following example I try to illustrate how seeing patients with a perceiving eye also
may contribute to reﬁning the clinical abilities of the physician:
Earwax is the problem for the next patient on the list, and the doctor envisages
a short consultation, hoping to catch up with some work that is behind. After
examining the patient’s ears, the physician conﬁrms the diagnosis and orders
the appropriate treatment. The consultation is over with in ﬁve minutes, and
the patient is supposed to leave. The doctor knows the patient from previous
consultations; he is a middle-aged man, well-ordered and with no medical
history. Still, today the physician becomes aware that something is different.
Maybe it is something in the way the patient walks, or talks that makes it
difﬁcult for the physician to end the consultation as planned. Maybe it is
something in the patient’s eyes that touches the physician, so that instead of
turning to his computer, he asks the patient one more time how he is doing. ‘‘I
do not sleep,’’ the patient answers. ‘‘Well, for how long a time have you not
been sleeping?’’ the physician asks. ‘‘Since I was twelve years old,’’ answers
the patient, who then he loses his well-ordered appearance and tells a history
of many years of child abuse in his childhood home, terrorized by a violent
father. The patient is upset and starts to cry, and the consultation turns into
something quite different from the treatment of bilateral earwax.
As I see it, this example illustrates the epistemic potential in holding on to the
concreteness in the situation by displaying the sensuous and perceiving eye instead
of immediately starting a process of abstraction. The physician could have
disciplined the situation by following his plan for an efﬁcient consultation and doing
a proper job treating the patient’s earwax. And many physicians do end their
consultations just like this. But an extra weight in the patient’s steps or something in
the patient’s eyes moved the physician, and by being aware of his own ‘‘seeing
emotions’’ in meeting with the patient, he captured some important information
regarding the patient’s clinical situation. This is important both in regard to the
medical state of the patient, by initializing further examination and treatment of his
insomnia, but also in relation to bringing forward the courage to live, as Martinsen
expresses it.
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So far, I have discussed central conceptions in the care philosophy of Kari
Martinsen in relation to medicine, focusing on her discussion of seeing in health
care and her conceptions of the perceiving and the recording eye. I have asserted
that seeing in medicine is dominated by a recording gaze and that the development
of a sensuous and perceiving gaze is important in order to facilitate care and reﬁne
clinical proﬁciency.
There are many aspects to discuss here, and I will not discuss Martinsen’s
theoretical perspective in this context more,
10 but I will discuss the possible
drawbacks of highlighting such a perspective in medicine. In this connection, it is
important to point out that even though care has been a marginalized area of inquiry
within the philosophy of medicine and medical ethics, there is an ongoing transition
in the medical ethical landscape by which the feasibility of ethics of care in relation
to medicine is being recognized within philosophy of medicine [10, 11, 42, 58],
medical education [8], feminist ethics [56] and medical anthropology [25].
There are, of course, many worries that might be raised for a care orientation in
the context of medicine and medical ethics. In the following section I will deal with
some of the arguments related to the assertion that a care perspective in medicine
will likely bring about bad consequences for patients and physicians. By this, I limit
my discussion to exclude critical arguments trying to assert that the notion of care
itself is problematic and unnecessary [2, 12, 19]. Let us look at some of the
objections that are particularly germane to the present discussion:
First, it might be said that caring interferes with proper medical practice by
inhibiting the doctor’s organization of information, in addition to the decision-
making process [32]. Beauchamp and Childress, discussing the virtue of compassion
in medicine, point to this connection in how compassion ‘‘can blind reason and
impartial reﬂection’’ [5]. ‘‘Constant contact with suffering can overwhelm and even
paralyze a compassionate physician and nurse,’’ they write (p. 40). In response to
this worry, it is important to point out that there is nothing intrinsic to the care
perspective that excludes appropriately detached forms of concern and compassion,
to paraphrase Carse [9]. ‘‘A good health care professional should be able to summon
the appropriate degree of emotional detachment, or equanimity, when this is crucial
to serving the well-being of the patient,’’ Carse argues (p. 23).
If we relate this objection to Martinsen’s perspective, we may ask whether the
display of a perceiving gaze in medicine may inhibit rather than facilitate medical
practice. First, according to Martinsen, proper care is not concordant with actions
that disrupt the necessary medical work. Here, I rely on her emphasis on
professional reﬂection in relation to the clinical encounter. In Martinsen’s view,
clinical judgment depends on professional knowledge to structure and organize the
10 Martinsen’s perspective has been debated widely. She has been criticized for pursuing an altruistic
notion of care [18, 50], and for emphasizing ‘‘samaritanism’’ as an ethical ideal in relation to the ethics of
care [50], as well as for romanticizing nursing practice [17]. She has been criticized for toning down the
importance of research and the need for scientiﬁc knowledge in nursing [46]. The use of Løgstrup’s ethics
and phenomenology as the main source for health care ethics also has been criticized [20]. A more
substantial elaboration of this critique is found in my forthcoming PhD thesis.
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Because of this, comforting the patient instead of initiating proper medical treatment
is not consistent with good care, but is more like what Martinsen denotes as
sentimental care. According to Martinsen, sentimental care is care in which the
caregiver’s participation in the other person’s suffering is limited to the caregiver’s
self-centred emotions [38]. When the caregiver conﬁnes him or herself to pitying
the patient and refrains from helping the patient in a professional manner, the care
becomes sentimental. Second, as we experienced in the example with the patient
with earwax and insomnia, care may be epistemologically essential in the clinical
encounter because caring attitudes and sensitivities may allow access to important
knowledge about the patient’s subjective experiences of illness, which may be
crucial in acquiring a proper understanding of the patient’s condition.
11 Accord-
ingly, from my point of view, the understanding of care as an inhibitor of medical
practice may be due to an inadequate conception of care as well as a failure to
recognize how care may contribute to reﬁning clinical proﬁciency by being
epistemologically relevant.
Second, it might be argued that caring for a patient may lead to difﬁculties for the
physician with regard to causing the patient therapeutically necessary pain or
breaking bad news to the patient [12]. As I see it, such a worry is based on an
inadequate conception of care and I refer to Martinsen’s conception of sentimental
care; according to Martinsen, care is more than feeling sorry for, having a liking for,
or being emotionally attached to someone. Care also involves a practical
participation in the other person’s suffering and concrete action based on
professional judgement. Therefore, to leave out a painful but important procedure
for the patient because of one’s caring for that patient is not concordant with proper
care.
Third, it might be said that there are important moral issues that may fall outside
the reach of an ethics of care. One main worry is that an ethic of care will have
nothing to say about certain forms of injustice [45]. Will physicians be inclined to
favour their patients over other physicians’ patients or the need of the community?
In this regard it is important to point out that the partialistic feature of an ethic of
care does not afﬂict the caring agent with ‘‘tunnel vision’’ [42]. This point is also
evident in Martinsen’s perspective that, besides emphasizing a spontaneous care
response towards the other, mediated through a perceiving eye, also emphasizes the
importance of professional judgment and reﬂection in the clinical encounter [39].
Accordingly, the professional may not have the opportunity to focus his or her
attention on the care of one person or group of persons to the complete exclusion of
the wants and needs of others. It is also important to point out that what is in
question in the care perspective is not necessarily to question the importance of
justice, but pointing to additional ways of moral reasoning [9]. Therefore, ‘‘an
11 The epistemic potential of care also is underscored by the conception of sensibility as explicated by
Nortvedt [47]. Nortvedt argues that sensibility, understood as the affective part of moral sensitivity, has
signiﬁcance for the health care workers’ moral motivation and clinical understanding: ‘‘To be emotionally
affected by the expressions of illness, of bodily weakness and pain, opens up for a medical gaze that both
can capture clinical signs of pathology while at the same time being able to care for the human condition
of the patient and sick individual,’’ he argues (p. 218).
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and care orientations so as to retain their respective strengths through rehabilitated
notions of ‘justice’ and ‘care’’’ [9].
The fourth difﬁculty relates to the previous objection and concerns the possible
tendency of an ethics of care to allow favouritism. ‘‘It would require a saint to care
for some really disgusting patients,’’ says Curzer [12], referring to a claim that it is
not possible to care equally for all patients. This is one of the reasons I consider
Ribes’s article (2009) to be both interesting and relevant. There has been an
understanding among doctors that self-injuring patients are difﬁcult, demanding and
manipulative [6, 43]. At the same time, recent research has found that good care
from doctors and health personnel is important for these patients to recover [43]. So,
how do we manage to care for ‘‘difﬁcult’’ and ‘‘demanding’’ patients? I do not have
a simple answer to this question. Yet, I consider Martinsen’s understanding of care
as being able ‘‘to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help,’’ involving an
emotional awareness and a relational and a practical competence to represent a more
feasible approach to the problem than an understanding of care, meaning to ‘‘have a
liking for,’’ which involves emotional attachment. The latter refers to the
understanding of care that Curzer refers and criticizes in his article [12]. Following
Martinsen, the important task is not whether we like the patient or whether we feel
attached to the patient as a friend, but whether we are able to see, or become aware
of the person’s suffering and express it independent of his or her sympathetic or
unsympathetic traits.
Burnout on the part of the physician also is identiﬁed as a possible drawback to
caring in medicine. A usual way of approaching this issue in medicine has been to
argue in favour of a detached model of care in which the physician remains
professional, i.e., cool and undisturbed by the patient’s situation. On the contrary,
the American physician and philosopher Jodi Halpern argues convincingly against
such an ideal of detachment in medicine, pointing to empirical studies indicating an
increased risk of burnout in relation to a medical practice characterized by
detachment, as well as pointing out how an empathic communication with patients
‘‘makes being a physician more meaningful and satisfying’’ [15, 16]. Kari Martinsen
also has been criticized in a similar manner for pursuing an altruistic concept of
care, allowing for self-sacriﬁce on the part of the health care professional [18, 50]. I
do not agree that Martinsen’s care perspective is altruistic in the sense that it implies
self-sacriﬁce. As I see it, these critics make their claim without taking into
consideration the consciousness of limit inherent in the professional reﬂection that
Martinsen emphasizes in relation to practical care work.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the development of a sensous and perceiving gaze is
important in medicine in order to facilitate care and reﬁne clinical proﬁciency.
Relying on the care philosophy of Kari Martinsen, I suggest that an understanding of
care as being able ‘‘to see and express the [patient’s] appeal for help’’ may represent
a fruitful way of dealing with care in medicine. By this, both the importance of
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practical dimension of care, are emphasized. Such an approach may further
contribute to protecting the integrity of patients, in addition to contributing to
reﬁning the clinical abilities of physicians in the clinical encounter. Possible
problems have been addressed, while some questions are also left open for further
inquiry: For instance, how do we train and educate physicians in this way of seeing
in medicine?
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